For a formal theory T, the diagonalizable algebra (a.k.a. Magari algebra) of T, denoted D T , is the Lindenbaum sentence algebra of T endowed with the unary operator T arising from the provability predicate of T: (the equivalence class of) a sentence ' is sent by T to (the equivalence class of) the T-sentence expressing that T proves '. It was shown in Shavrukov 6] that the diagonalizable algebras of PA and ZF, as well as the diagonalizable algebras of similarly related pairs of 1 -sound theories, are not isomorphic. Neither are these algebras rst-order equivalent ( S h a vrukov 7 , Theorem 2.11]).
1. Conventions. Theories in this paper are rst order r.e. theories over classical predicate logic. We assume that a translation of the arithmetic language into that of each theory is xed and do not distinguish between arithmetical and translated arithmetical formulas. The arithmetic of any theory is presumed to be at least as strong as I 0 + E x p (cf. H ajek & Pudl ak 3, I.1(b)]).
We also assume that each theory T comes equipped with a provability predicate T (we shall be omitting the subscript whenever reasonable). Note that we use the same notation for the provability predicate as for an opeator of D T . The formula T ' expresses in a natural way that ' has a proof from an axiom set speci ed by a (Kalm ar) elementary formula which describes, in the standard model, a set of sentences axiomatizing T. classical predicate logic (see 3, I.4(a)]). We shall use the notation x : T ' to denote the elementary formula expressing that the sentence ' has a T-proof whose code is x.
2. Definitions. Let S and T be theories and let ; be a class of sentences common to the languages of both theories. S and T are called ;-coherent if (i) S j ; i T j ; for any ; sentence , a n d (ii) b o t h S a n d T p r o ve 8x 9y 8 2; ( ( x For a theory S, we let S denote the class of sent e n c e s o f t h e form S ' and hope this does not lead to confusion. The Friedman{Goldfarb{Harrington Principle, which i s readily veri able in I 0 + Exp, states that the class of S sentences is, modulo (I 0 + Exp)-provable equivalence, the same as the class of 1 sentences S-provably implied B
( ) coherence is the central notion in this paper. Observe t h a t b y t h e F riedman{
Goldfarb{Harrington Principle the class is closed under conjunction and disjunction, and therefore, when establishing B( ) coherence between two theories, it is su cient i n (i) and (ii) to consider only sentences of the forms ' ! and : ' rather than arbitrary B( ) s e n tences.
Given a class ; of arithmetical sentences of bounded complexity, e . g . ; = n , w e recall that there is a formula True( ), to which w e shall refer as truth de nition for ;, s.t. Finally, i f w e h a ve S j ; S k $ m then T j ; S k $ ' m because S k is a sentence. Moreover, T j ; S k $ T ' k by B( ) coherence, whence T j ; T ' k $ ' m follows.
Thus e is indeed an isomorphism.
If is an arbitrary sentence, then S j ; $ m implies T j ; $ ' m by B( ) coherence. Therefore e( ) = as claimed. 5 . Theorem. Let S and T beB( )-coherent theories. Then D S = D T .
Proof. Follows at once from Proposition 4.
In the following examples concerning individual theories it is understood that the translation of arithmetic into the languages of the latter is the conventional (in most cases the identical) one, and that the diagonalizable algebras feature natural provability predicates of those theories, so that known conservativity results among the theories formalize for the provability predicates chosen. (b). ZFC knows that !, +, and are absolute for L and forcing extensions. Hence these pairs are coherent for rst-order arithmetic sentences.
(c). By PRA here we mean the rst order theory called (QF(PR){IA) in Sieg 9] . Among the available proofs of 2 conservativity o f I 1 over PRA, the one in Sieg 9, Lemma 2.1.2] probably presents the more convenient opportunity to see that this conservativity formalizes in I 1 (or even in I 0 + Superexp) and hence, by that same conservativity, in PRA. On top of that, 2 conservativity also allows us to conclude that PRA is closed under 1 {CR because I 1 is, for the latter theory contains B 1 We turn next to the subject of automorphisms. is a B( ) sentence. Now, (1) and (2) imply that for any B( ) s e n tence T j ; ' ! i T j ; ! , a n d T j ; ! ' i T j ; ! , which, when properly formalized, means that (T ') and (T ) are B( )-coherent. Next, (either one of) (1) and (2) also imply that T j ; ' $ i for some B( ) sentence , T j ; $ . We h a ve assumed the r.h.s. not to be the case. Therefore, T j ; = ' $ . By Proposition 4 we conclude the existence of an automorphism as described in the statement. 8 . Question. Can automorphisms move sentences?
